We study modal completeness and incompleteness of several sublogics of the interpretability logic IL. We introduce the sublogic IL − , and prove that IL − is sound and complete with respect to Veltman prestructures which are introduced by Visser. Moreover, we prove the modal completeness of twelve logics between IL − and IL with respect to Veltman prestructures. On the other hand, we prove that eight natural sublogics of IL are modally incomplete. Finally, we prove that these incomplete logics are complete with respect to generalized Veltman prestructures. As a consequence of these investigations, we obtain that the twenty logics studied in this paper are all decidable.
Introduction
The notion of formalized provability is well-studied in the framework of modal logic. The provability logic of Peano Arithmetic PA is the set of all modal formulas that are verifiable in PA when the modal operator is interpreted as the provability predicate Pr PA (x) of PA. Solovay's arithmetical completeness theorem [9] states that the provability logic of PA is exactly axiomatized by the modal logic GL that is obtained from the smallest normal modal logic K by adding the axiom scheme ( A → A) → A. Segerberg [7] proved that the logic GL is sound and complete with respect to the class of all transitive and conversely well-founded finite Kripke frames.
The interpretability logic IL is the base logic for modal logical investigations of the notion of relative interpretability. The language of IL is that of GL with the additional binary modal operator . The intended meaning of the formula A B is "PA + B is relatively interpretable in PA + A". The inference rules of IL are the same as that of GL, and the axioms of IL are that of GL together with the following axioms:
J2 (A B) ∧ (B C) → A C;
J3 (A C) ∧ (B C) → (A ∨ B) C; 3, we investigate several axiom schemata and extensions of IL − . Section 4 is devoted to proving lemmas used to prove our modal completeness theorems. Our modal completeness theorem with respect to IL − -frames is proved in Section 5. In Section 6, we prove several natural sublogics of IL are incomplete with respect to IL − -frames. Finally, in Section 7, we prove these incomplete logics are complete with respect to IL − set -frames.
The logic IL

−
In this section, we introduce and investigate the logic IL − . The language of IL − consists of countably many propositional variables p, q, r, . . ., logical constants , ⊥, connectives ¬, ∧, ∨, → and modal operators , . We show that every theorem of IL − is valid in all IL − -frames. In fact, we will prove in Section 5 that IL − is sound and complete with respect to the class of all (finite) IL − -frames. The logic IL − is the basis for our logics discussed in this paper. First, we introduce the logic IL − .
Definition 2.1. The axiom schemata of the logic IL − are as follows: 
R1
A → B C A → C B ;
The logic GL consists of the axiom schemata L1, L2 and L3, and of the inference rules Modus Ponens and Necessitation (in the language without ). Hence IL − is an extension of GL. We introduce IL − -frames that are originally introduced by Visser [10] as Veltman prestructures. Definition 2.2. We say that a triple W, R, {S x } x∈W is an IL − -frame if it satisfies the following conditions:
1. W is a non-empty set;
2. R is a transitive and conversely well-founded binary relation on W ; 3. For each x ∈ W , S x is a binary relation on W satisfying ∀y, z ∈ W (yS x z ⇒ xRy).
For each x ∈ W , let ↑ (x) := {y ∈ W : xRy}. In this notation, the third clause above states that S x is a relation on ↑ (x) × W . A quadruple W, R, {S x } x∈W , is called an IL − -model if W, R, {S x } x∈W is an IL − -frame and is a binary relation between W and the set of all formulas satisfying the usual conditions for satisfaction with the following conditions:
A ⇐⇒ ∀y ∈ W (xRy ⇒ y A).
• x A B ⇐⇒ ∀y ∈ W (y A ⇒ ∃z ∈ W (yS x z & z B)).
A formula A is said to be valid in an IL − -frame W, R, {S x } x∈W if for all satisfaction relations on the frame and all x ∈ W , x A.
We prove that IL − is sound with respect to the class of all IL − -frames.
Proposition 2.3. Every theorem of IL
− is valid in all IL − -frames.
Proof. We prove by induction on the length of proofs in IL − . Since the modal logic GL is sound with respect to the class of all transitive and conversely wellfounded Kripke frames (see [2] ), all axioms of GL in the language of IL − are valid in all IL − -frames. That is, L1, L2 and L3 are valid in all IL − -frames. Then it suffices to prove that J3 and J6 are valid in all IL − -frames, and the rules R1 and R2 preserve the validity.
Let x ∈ W be any element and be any satisfaction relation on F . J3: Suppose x (A C) ∧ (B C). Let y ∈ W be any element with xRy and y A ∨ B. In either case of y A and y B, there exists z ∈ W such that yS x z and z C. Thus we obtain x (A ∨ B) C.
J6: (→): Suppose x A. Then there is no y ∈ W such that xRy and y ¬A. Hence x (¬A) ⊥.
(←): Suppose x (¬A) ⊥. If there were y ∈ W with xRy and y ¬A, then there would be some z ∈ W such that z ⊥, a contradiction. Thus if xRy, then y A, and this means x A. R1: Assume A → B is valid in F . Suppose x C A and let y ∈ W be such that xRy and y C. Then there exists z ∈ W such that yS x z and z A. By the assumption, z B. Then we obtain x C B.
R2: Assume A → B is valid in F . Suppose x B C and let y ∈ W be such that xRy and y A. By the assumption, y B, and hence there exists z ∈ W such that yS x z and z C. Thus we have x A C.
By the rules R1 and R2, we immediately obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2.4. Let L be a logic with the inference rules R1 and R2. If
In this paper, we freely use Proposition 2.4 without any mention. In IL − , the inference rule R2 is strengthened as follows.
Proposition 2.5.
IL
By the axiom J6, we obtain IL
Thus IL
− is deductively equivalent to the system obtained from IL − by replacing the rule R2 by the axiom scheme (A → B) → (B C → A C).
In Section 5, we will prove that several extensions of IL − are complete with respect to corresponding classes of IL − -frames. On the other hand, we will also prove that several logics are not complete. To prove this incompleteness, we use the notion of IL − set -frames that is a general notion of IL-frames or generalized Veltman frames introduced by de Jongh (see [12] ). 1. W is a non-empty set; 2. R is a transitive and conversely well-founded binary relation on W ; 3. For each x ∈ W , S x is a relation on W × (P(W ) \ {∅}) such that ∀y ∈ W, ∀V ∈ P(W ) \ {∅}(yS x V ⇒ xRy).
(Monotonicity
As in the definition of IL − -frames, we can define IL − set -models W, R, {S x } x∈W , with the following clause: 
be an IL − set -model, x ∈ W be any element and be any satisfaction relation on F .
J3: Suppose x (A C) ∧ (B C). Let y ∈ W be any element such that xRy and y A ∨ B. In either case that y A and y B, there exists V ∈ P(W )\{∅} such that yS x V and ∀z ∈ V (z C). Therefore x (A∨B) C.
J6: This follows from the following equivalences:
R1: Assume that A → B is valid in F . Suppose x B C and let y ∈ W be any element with xRy and y A. Then y B by the assumption, and hence there exists V ∈ P(W ) \ {∅} such that yS x V and ∀z ∈ V (z C). Thus we have x A C.
R2: Assume that A → B is valid in F . Suppose x C A. Let y ∈ W be such that xRy and y C. Then there exists V ∈ P(W ) \ {∅} such that yS x V and ∀z ∈ V (z A). For each z ∈ V , z B by the assumption. Therefore we conclude x C B.
Extensions of IL
−
In this section, we investigate several additional axiom schemata and several extensions of IL − . Let Σ 1 , . . . , Σ n be axiom schemata. Then IL − (Σ 1 , . . . , Σ n ) is the logic IL − together with the axiom schemata Σ 1 , . . . , Σ n . Let L be an extension of IL − . We say that L is complete with respect to finite IL − -frames (resp. IL 
The axiom scheme J1
In this subsection, we investigate the axiom scheme J1.
First, we show that the following axiom scheme J1 is equivalent to J1 over IL − .
J1 A A.
Proposition 3.1. The logics IL − (J1) and IL − (J1 ) are deductively equivalent.
, we obtain the desired result.
Therefore, in this paper, we sometimes identify the axiom schemata J1 and J1 .
The following proposition is due to Visser.
Proposition 3.2 (Visser [10] ). Let F = W, R, {S x } x∈W be any IL − -frame. Then the following are equivalent:
We prove a similar equivalence concerning IL − set -frames. Proposition 3.3. Let F = W, R, {S x : x ∈ W } be any IL − set -frame. Then the following are equivalent:
Proof. (1 ⇒ 2): Assume that J1 is valid in F . Suppose xRy. Let be a satisfaction relation on F satisfying for any u ∈ W , u p if and only if u = y for some fixed propositional variable p. Then xRy and y p. Since x p p, there exists V ∈ P(W ) \ {∅} such that yS x V and ∀z ∈ V (z p). By the definition of , V = {y} because V is non-empty. We obtain yS x {y}.
(2 ⇒ 1): Assume ∀x, y ∈ W (xRy ⇒ yS x {y}). Let y ∈ W be such that xRy and y A. Then yS x {y} and ∀z ∈ {y}(z A). Thus we conclude x A A.
The axiom scheme J4
This subsection is devoted to investigating the axiom scheme J4.
First, we prove that J4 is equivalent to the following axiom scheme J4 over IL − . The principle J4 is introduced in Visser [10] . Proof. This is because IL
Since J4 is a particular instance of the axiom scheme J2, we obtain the following corollary. The axiom scheme J4 does not behave well by itself in the sense of modal completeness. In fact, we will prove in Section 6 that for instance, IL − (J4) is not complete with respect to corresponding class of IL − -frames. Thus we introduce a well-behaved axiom scheme J4 + whose corresponding class of IL − -frames is same as that of J4. The principle J4 + is originally introduced in Visser [10] . We also introduce the schemata J4 + and J4 + as follows:
The axiom scheme J4 + is a strengthening of the inference rule R1, and hence in extensions of IL − (J4 + ), the inference rule R1 is redundant. We show that J4 + implies J4 over IL − .
We prove that J4 and J4 + have the same frame condition with respect to IL − -frames. This is stated in Visser [10] .
Proposition 3.8 (Visser [10] ). Let F = W, R, S xx∈W be any IL − -frame. Then the following are equivalent:
On the other hand, J4 and J4 + can be distinguished by considering IL 2. ∀x, y ∈ W, ∀V ∈ P(W ) \ {∅}(yS x V ⇒ ∃z ∈ V (xRz)).
Proof. (1 ⇒ 2): Assume that J4 is valid in F , and suppose yS x V . Let be a satisfaction relation on F such that for any u ∈ W , u p if and only if u = y, and u q if and only if u ∈ V for some fixed propositional variables p and q. Then x p q because V is non-empty. Since xRy and y p, we have x ♦p. Then by the validity of J4, x ♦q. Hence there exists z ∈ W such that xRz and z q. By the definition of , we obtain z ∈ V .
Then there exists y ∈ W such that xRy and y A, and also there exists a non-empty V ∈ P(W ) such that yS x V and ∀z ∈ V (z B). By the assumption, xRz for some z ∈ V . Hence x ♦B. This shows that J4 is valid in F .
Then the following are equivalent:
be a satisfaction relation on F such that for any u ∈ W , u p if and only if u = y, u q if and only if u ∈ V , and u r if and only if (u ∈ V and xRu), for some fixed propositional variables p, q and r. Then x p q because V is non-empty. Let y ∈ W be any element such that xRy and y q, then y ∈ V and xRy. This means y r. Therefore x (q → r). By the validity of J4 + , we obtain x p r. Since xRy and y p, there exists a non-empty U ∈ P(W ) such that yS x U and ∀z ∈ U (z r). By the definition of , for each z ∈ U , z ∈ V and xRz. That is, U ⊆ V ∩ ↑ (x). By Monotonicity, we conclude yS
Let y ∈ W be such that xRy and y A, then there exists a non-empty V ∈ P(W ) such that yS x V and ∀z ∈ V (z B). By the assumption, yS x (V ∩ ↑ (x)). In particular, for each z ∈ V ∩ ↑ (x), z B and z B → C, and hence z C. We have shown x A C. Therefore J4 + is valid in F .
By Proposition 3.10, when we consider logics containing J4 + , then for each IL − set -frame W, R, {S x } x∈W , we may assume that for every x ∈ W , S x is a relation on ↑ (x) × (P(↑ (x)) \ {∅}). This is required in the original definition of IL set -frames (see [12] ).
The axiom scheme J2
In this subsection, we discuss the axiom scheme J2.
As in the case of the axiom J4, we introduce the following new axiom schemata J2 + and J2 + which are stronger than J2.
Proposition 3.11. The logics IL − (J2 + ) and IL + (J2 + ) are deductively equivalent.
The axiom scheme J2 + is slightly stronger than J2. In fact, the following proposition shows that J2 and J2 + are equivalent over the logic IL − (J1).
Proposition 3.12.
We proved in Corollary 3.5 that IL − (J2) proves J4. Analogously, we prove that J2 + is stronger than J4 + over IL − .
The following corollary is straightforward from Proposition 3.12.2 and Proposition 3.13.
Corollary 3.14. IL − (J1, J2) J4 + .
We prove that J2 and J2 + have the same frame condition.
Proposition 3.15. Let F = W, R, {S x } x∈W be any IL − -frame. Then the following are equivalent:
3. J4 is valid in F and for any x ∈ W , S x is transitive.
Proof. (1 ⇒ 2): By Proposition 3.12.1.
(2 ⇒ 3): This is stated in Visser [10] . (3 ⇒ 1): Assume that J4 is valid in F and for any x ∈ W , S x is transitive. Suppose x (A (B ∨ C)) ∧ (B C). Let y ∈ W be any element such that xRy and y A. Then there exists z ∈ W such that yS x z and z B ∨ C. We shall show that there exists u ∈ W such that yS x u and u C. If z C, then this is done. If z C, then z B. Since xRz, by our supposition, there exists u ∈ W such that zS x u and u C. By the transitivity of S x , we obtain yS x u.
Therefore we conclude x A C. That is to say, J2 + is valid in F .
We prove that J2 and J2 + have different frame conditions with respect to IL − set -frames.
Assume that J2 is valid in F . Then by Corollary 3.5, J4 is valid in F . Suppose yS x V and ∀z ∈ V ∩ ↑ (x)(zS x U z ). Let be a satisfaction relation on F such that for any u ∈ W , u p if and only if u = y, u q if and only if u ∈ V , and u r if and only if ∃z ∈ V ∩ ↑ (x)(u ∈ U z ). Then x p q and x q r. By the validity of J2, x p r. Since xRy and y p, there exists a non-empty U ∈ P(W ) such that yS x U and ∀w ∈ U (w r). By the definition of ,
. Let y ∈ W be any element with xRy and y A. Then there exists a non-empty V ∈ P(W ) such that yS x V and ∀z ∈ V (z B). Since J4 is valid in F , we have V ∩ ↑ (x) = ∅. Then for each z ∈ V ∩ ↑ (x), there exists U z ∈ P(W ) \ {∅} such that zS x U z and ∀w ∈ U z (w C). By the assumption, yS x ( z∈V ∩↑(x) U z ) because the set z∈V ∩↑(x) U z is non-empty. Also ∀w ∈ z∈V ∩↑(x) U z (w C). We have shown w A C. Hence J2 is valid in F .
.16 is required in the original definition of IL set -frames.
Proposition 3.17. Let F = W, R, {S x : x ∈ W } be any IL − set -frame. Then the following are equivalent:
be a satisfaction relation on F such that for any u ∈ W , u p if and only if u = y, u q if and only if u ∈ V 0 , and u r if and only if (∃z ∈ V 0 ∩ ↑ (x)(u ∈ U z ) or u ∈ V 1 ). Then x p (q ∨ r) and x q r. By the validity of J2 + , x p r. Since xRy and y p, there exists a non-empty U ∈ P(W ) \ {∅} such that yS x U and ∀w ∈ U (w r). Then by the definition of , we have
. Let y ∈ W be such that xRy and y A, then there exists a non-empty V ∈ P(W ) such that yS x V and ∀z ∈ V (z B ∨ C). Since J4 is valid, we have V ∩ ↑ (x) = ∅. Let V 0 := {z ∈ V : z B} and
there exists a non-empty U z ∈ P(W ) such that zS x U z and ∀w ∈ U z (w C). By the assumption, we have yS x ( z∈V0∩↑(x) U z ∪V 1 ) because z∈V0∩↑(x) U z ∪V 1 is non-empty. Since ∀w ∈ z∈V0∩↑(x) U z ∪ V 1 (w C), we obtain w A C. Therefore J2 + is valid in F .
The axiom scheme J5
We investigate J5.
The following proposition is stated in Visser [10] . Proposition 3.18 (Visser [10] ). Let F = W, R, {S x } x∈W be any IL − -frame. The following are equivalent:
Proposition 3.19. Let F = W, R, {S x : x ∈ W } be any IL − set -frame. Then the following are equivalent:
Proof. (1 ⇒ 2): Assume that J5 is valid in F . Suppose xRy and yRz. Let be a satisfaction relation on F such that for any u ∈ W , u p if and only if u = z for some fixed propositional variable p. Then yRz and z p, and hence xRy and y ♦p. Since x ♦p p, there exists a non-empty set V ∈ P(W ) such that yS x V and ∀w ∈ V (w p). By the definition of , we have V = {z}. Therefore yS x {z}.
(2 ⇒ 1): Assume ∀x, y, z ∈ W (xRy & yRz ⇒ yS x {z}). Let y ∈ W be any element such that xRy and y ♦A. Then there exists z ∈ W such that yRz and z A. By the assumption, yS x {z}. Since ∀w ∈ {z}(w A), we obtain x ♦A A. That is, J5 is valid in F .
The condition stated in the second clause in Proposition 3.19 is required in the original definition of IL set -frames.
The logics CL and IL
In this subsection, we show that the logics CL and IL are exactly IL − (J1, J2) and IL − (J1, J2, J5), respectively. Since IL − (J1, J2) proves J2 + and J4 + by Proposition 3.12 and Corollary 3.14, our logics studied in this paper are actually sublogics of IL. The logic CL is GL plus J1, J2, J3 and J4. Also the logic IL is CL plus J5. Proposition 3.20.
CL
A ↔ (¬A) ⊥.
2. This is because CL
3. This is because CL (A → B) → A B by J1 and CL (A B) ∧ (B C) → A C by J2. Theorem 3.23 (de Jongh and Veltman [3] ). For any formula A, the following are equivalent:
2.
A is valid in all finite IL − -frames where all axioms of IL − (J1, J2, J5) are valid.
Theorem 3.24 (Ignatiev [5] ). For any formula A, the following are equivalent:
A is valid in all finite IL − -frames where all axioms of IL − (J1, J2) are valid.
In the following, we identify CL with IL − (J1, J2), and IL with IL − (J1, J2, J5).
Lemmas for proofs of modal completeness theorems
In this section, we prepare some definitions and lemmas for our proofs of the modal completeness theorems of several logics. In this section, let L be any consistent logic containing IL − . For a set Φ of formulas, define Φ := {B : there exists a formula C such that either B C ∈ Φ or C B ∈ Φ}. For each formula A, let ∼ A :≡ B if A is of the form ¬B ¬A otherwise . We say a finite set Γ of formulas is L-consistent if L Γ → ⊥, where Γ is a conjunction of all elements of Γ. Also we say Γ ⊆ Φ is Φ-maximally L-consistent if Γ is Lconsistent and for any A ∈ Φ, either A ∈ Γ or ∼ A ∈ Γ. Notice that if Γ is Φ-maximally L-consistent and L Γ → A for A ∈ Φ, then A ∈ Γ.
Definition 4.1. A set Φ of formulas is said to be adequate if it satisfies the following conditions:
1. Φ is closed under taking subformulas and applying ∼;
Then the following proposition clearly holds. Proposition 4.2. Every finite set of formulas is contained in some finite adequate set.
Until the end of this section, we fix some finite adequate set Φ. Let K L := {Γ ⊆ Φ : Γ is Φ-maximally L-consistent}. Then K L is also a finite set. Definition 4.3. Let Γ, ∆ ∈ K L and C ∈ Φ .
1. Γ ≺ ∆ : ⇐⇒ 1. for any B ∈ Φ, if B ∈ Γ, then B, B ∈ ∆ and 2.
there exists B ∈ Φ such that B / ∈ Γ and B ∈ ∆.
2. Γ ≺ C ∆ : ⇐⇒ Γ ≺ ∆ and for any B ∈ Φ, if B C ∈ Γ, then ∼ B ∈ ∆.
, and thus D E ∈ Γ. This contradicts our supposition. Therefore
Thus (D → X) ∈ Γ, and this is a contradiction. We have shown that
Moreover, if G E ∈ Γ, then G ∈ X, and hence ∼ G ∈ ∆. This means Γ ≺ E ∆.
• a. Assume that L contains J5. Let
Then it can be proved that Y 1 is also an L-consistent subset of Φ as above. Let ∆ ∈ K L be such that Y 1 ⊆ ∆. Then ∆ satisfies the required conditions.
• b. Assume that L contains J2 and J5. Let
Then Y 2 is also an L-consistent subset of Φ, and any ∆ ∈ K L with Y 2 ⊆ ∆ is a desired set.
c. If L contains J2 + and J5, then Γ ≺ * F Θ and ∼ F ∈ Θ also hold. Proof. Suppose D E ∈ Γ, Γ ≺ F ∆ and D ∈ ∆.
• Suppose, towards a contradiction, that the set {E, ∼ F } is L-inconsistent.
Then L E → F . By the rule R1, we have L D E → D F , and hence D F ∈ Γ. Since Γ ≺ F ∆, we have ∼ D ∈ ∆. This contradicts the L-consistency of ∆. Therefore {E, ∼ F } is L-consistent. Let Θ ∈ K L be such that {E, ∼ F } ⊆ Θ, and then Θ satisfies the required conditions.
• a. Assume that L contains J4
Since D E ∈ Γ, we obtain D F ∈ Γ. Then ∼ D ∈ ∆ because Γ ≺ F ∆, and this is a contradiction. Therefore
Then (E → F ) ∈ Γ, and this is a contradiction. Thus
Then (E → F ) ∈ Θ \ Γ, and hence we conclude Γ ≺ Θ.
• b. Assume that L contains J2 + . Let X := {G :
and this is a contradiction. Hence (E
• c. Assume that L contains J2 + and J5. Let X := {G : G F ∈ Γ} and
As in the proof of Lemma 4.6.b, it can be shown that (E → X 1 ) is not in Γ. Let In this section, we prove modal completeness theorems with respect to IL − -frames for twelve sublogics of IL. First, we prove the completeness theorem for logics in Figure 1 other than IL − (J2 + , J5) and IL. Secondly, we prove the completeness theorem for logics IL − (J2 + , J5) and IL. Our proof technique of the second completeness theorem is essentially same as in the proof of de Jongh and Veltman [3] . On the other hand, our proof of the first completeness theorem admits a simpler technique than that of the second theorem. More precisely, in the proof of the second theorem, the universe a countermodel is defined as a set of tuples Γ, τ where Γ is a Φ-maximal L-consistent subset of a finite adequate set Φ and τ is a finite sequence of formulas in Φ. On the other hand, in our proof of the first theorem, we simply consider tuples Γ, B where B is a formula in Φ to define a countermodel. As a consequence, our proof of the completeness theorem of the logic CL is simpler than Ignatiev's proof in [5] . 
), CL and IL − (J1, J4 + , J5). Then for any formula A, the following are equivalent: Let M = W, R, {S x } x∈W , be a model satisfying the following clauses:
3. ∆, C S Γ,B Θ, D ⇐⇒ Γ, B R ∆, C and the condition C L which is defined below holds;
The condition C L is different for each L, and defined as follows:
•
• L ∈ {IL
Here D ≡ C means that formulas D and C are identical. Then W is finite and R is a transitive and conversely well-founded binary relation on W . Thus W, R, {S x } x∈W is an IL − -frame.
Lemma 5.2. Every axiom of L is valid in the frame
Proof. We distinguish the following several cases:
• L = IL − (J5): Suppose Γ, B R ∆, C and ∆, C R Θ, D . If Γ ≺ C ∆ and ∼ C ∈ ∆, then ∼ C ∈ Θ because ∆ ≺ Θ. Thus ∆, C S Γ,B Θ, D holds. Then by Proposition 3.18, J5 is valid in F .
• For other cases, the lemma is proved in a similar way as above. Proof. We prove by induction on the construction of C. We only give a proof of the case C ≡ (D E).
(⇒): Assume D E ∈ Γ. Let ∆, F be any element of W such that Γ, B R ∆, F and ∆, F D. Then by induction hypothesis, D ∈ ∆. We distinguish the following two cases.
• If Γ ≺ F ∆, then by Lemma 4.7, there exists Θ ∈ K L such that E ∈ Θ and
In either case, we have Θ, F ∈ W . Also E ∈ Θ and ∆, F S Γ,B Θ, F . Then by induction hypothesis, Θ, F E. Therefore we conclude Γ, B D E.
D by induction hypothesis. Let Θ, F be any element of W with ∆, E S Γ,B Θ, F . By the definitions of the relation S and the condition C L , we have ∼ E ∈ Θ in all cases of L By induction hypothesis, Θ, F E. Therefore we obtain Γ, B D E.
Since ⊥ ∈ Φ , we have Γ 0 , ⊥ ∈ W . Since A / ∈ Γ 0 , Γ 0 , ⊥ A by Truth Lemma. Therefore A is not valid in M .
Our proof of Theorem 5.1 cannot be applied to logics containing both J2 and J5. For example, for L = IL − (J2 + , J5), the condition C L which is used to define the relation S might be as follows: Γ, B R Θ, D and if Γ ≺ C ∆ and ∼ C ∈ ∆, then D ≡ C, Γ ≺ C Θ and ∼ C ∈ Θ. Then J5 is no longer valid in the resulting frame W, R, {S x } x∈W . To avoid this obstacle, as mentioned above, for the modal completeness of such logics, we consider tuples W, τ as members of the universe of our countermodel, where τ is a finite sequence of formulas.
For finite sequences τ and σ of formulas, τ ⊆ σ denotes that τ is an initial segment of σ. Also τ σ denotes that τ is a proper initial segment of σ, that is, τ ⊆ σ and |τ | < |σ|, where |τ | is the length of τ . Let τ * B be the sequence obtained from τ by concatenating B as the last element. 
For each Γ ∈ K L , we define the rank of Γ (write rank(Γ)) as follows: rank(Γ) := sup{rank(∆) + 1 : Γ ≺ ∆}, where sup ∅ = 0. This is well-defined because ≺ is conversely well-founded.
Let M = W, R, {S x } x∈W , be a model satisfying the following clauses:
and τ is a finite sequence of elements of Φ with rank(Γ) + |τ | ≤ rank(Γ 0 )};
2. Γ, τ R ∆, σ ⇐⇒ Γ ≺ ∆ and τ σ;
Then W is finite because of the condition rank(Γ) + |τ | ≤ rank(Γ 0 ). Also W, R, {S x } x∈W is an IL − -frame.
Proof. J2 + : By the definition of S, J4 + is obviously valid in F . Assume
Thus we obtain ∆ 0 , σ 0 S Γ,τ ∆ 2 , σ 2 . Therefore J2 + is valid in F by Proposition 3.17.
J5: Assume that Γ, τ R ∆, σ and ∆, σ R Θ, ρ . Suppose τ * C ⊆ σ, Γ ≺ * C ∆ and ∼ C ∈ ∆. Since σ ρ, we have τ * C ⊆ ρ. Since Γ ≺ * C ∆ and ∆ ≺ Θ, Γ ≺ * C Θ by Lemma 4.5. Also we have ∼ C, ∼ C ∈ Θ because ∆ ≺ Θ. Therefore we obtain ∆, σ S Γ,τ Θ, ρ . By Proposition 3.18, J5 is valid in F .
At last, we assume L = IL and show that J1 is valid in F . Suppose Γ, τ R ∆, σ , Γ ≺ * C ∆ and ∼ C ∈ ∆. Since C C ∈ Γ, ∼ C ∈ ∆. Thus we have ∆, σ S Γ,τ ∆, σ . By Proposition 3.2, J1 is valid in F . Proof. This is proved by induction on the construction of C, and we prove only for C ≡ (D E).
(⇒): Assume D E ∈ Γ. Let ∆, σ be any element of W such that Γ, τ R ∆, σ and ∆, σ D. Then by induction hypothesis, D ∈ ∆. We distinguish the following two cases.
• If τ * F ⊆ σ, Γ ≺ * F ∆ and ∼ F ∈ ∆ for some F , then by Lemma 4.7, there exists Θ ∈ K L such that E ∈ Θ, Γ ≺ * F Θ and ∼ F, ∼ F ∈ Θ.
• If not, by Lemma 4.7, there exists Θ ∈ K L such that E ∈ Θ and Γ ≺ Θ because Γ ≺ ⊥ ∆.
In either case, we have rank ( Let be the empty sequence. Then rank(Γ 0 ) + | | = rank(Γ 0 ), and hence Γ 0 , ∈ W . Since A / ∈ Γ 0 , Γ 0 , A by Truth Lemma. Therefore A is not valid in M .
As a corollary to Theorems 5.1 and 5.4, we have the decidability of these logics.
Corollary 5.7. Every logic shown in Figure 1 is decidable.
Since every IL
− -frame can be transformed into an IL − set -frame, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 5.8. Let L be one of twelve logics in Figure 1 and let A be any formula. Then the following are equivalent: Proof. Let F = W, R, {S x } x∈W be the IL − set -frame defined as follows:
By Monotonicity of S x , F is actually an IL − set -frame. First, we prove that J2, J4 + and J5 are valid in F .
• J4 + : If yS x V , then V ∩ ↑ (x) = V \ {x}. By the definition of S x , we have yS x (V \ {x}). Thus yS x (V ∩ ↑ (x)). By Proposition 3.10, J4 + is valid in F .
• J2: Since IL − (J4 + ) J4, J4 is also valid in F . Suppose yS x V and ∀z ∈ V ∩ ↑ (x)(zS x U z ). Then y 2 ∈ V if y is either y 0 , y 1 or y 2 . Also since y 2 ∈ V ∩ ↑ (x), there exists U y2 ⊆ W such that y 2 S x U y2 . By the definition of S x , U y2 ⊇ {y 0 , y 1 , y 2 }. Thus z∈V ∩↑(x) U z ⊇ {y 0 , y 1 , y 2 }. Then we have yS x ( z∈V ∩↑(x) U z ) if y is either y 0 , y 1 or y 2 . Therefore J2 is valid in F by Proposition 3.16.
• J5: Since there are no y, z ∈ W such that xRy and yRz, by Proposition 3.19, J5 is trivially valid in F .
It suffices to show that J2 + is not valid in F . Let V 0 = {y 1 } and Proof. We define the IL − set -frame F = W, R, {S x } x∈W as follows:
Indeed, F is an IL − set -frame. We show J1, J4 and J5 are valid in F .
• J1: Since y 0 S x {y 0 } and y 1 S x {y 1 }, J1 is valid by Proposition 3.3.
• J4: Suppose yS x V . Then whatever y is, either y 0 ∈ V or y 1 ∈ V . Thus there exists z ∈ V such that xRz. Hence J4 is valid in F by Proposition 3.9.
• J5: As in the proof of Proposition 6.1, J5 is trivially valid in F .
Then we show that J4 + is not valid in F . Let V = {y 1 , y 2 }, then y 0 S x V . On the other hand, since V ∩ ↑ (x) = {y 1 }, y 0 S x (V ∩ ↑ (x)) does not hold. Therefore J4 + is not valid in F by Proposition 3.10. 
We define a model M = W, R, {S x } x∈W , as follows:
The set W is finite and the relation R is transitive and conversely wellfounded. Moreover, by Monotonicity of S x , F = W, R, {S x } x∈W is an IL − setframe. We distinguish the following five cases:
Hence ∆, C S Γ,B { ∆, C }. We conclude that J1 is valid in F by Proposition 3.3.
• L = IL − (J2): Assume that ∆, C S Γ,B V and for any ∆ , C ∈ V ∩ ↑ ( Γ, B ), ∆ , C S Γ,B U ∆ ,C . We distinguish the following two cases:
In either case, we obtain ∆, C S Γ,B ( ∆ ,C ∈V ∩↑( Γ,B ) U ∆ ,C ) by Monotonicity. Thus we conclude that J2 is valid in F by Proposition 3.13.
• L = IL − (J2, J4 + ): As in the case of IL − (J2), J2 is valid in F .
Suppose ∆, C S Γ,B V . We distinguish the following two cases:
In either case, we have ∆, C S Γ,B V . Also we have V ⊆ V ∩ ↑ ( Γ, B ). By Monotonicity, ∆, C S Γ,B (V ∩ ↑ ( Γ, B )). Therefore J4 + is valid in F by Proposition 3.10.
• • L = IL − (J1, J4, J5): As in the cases of IL − (J1, J4) and IL − (J4, J5), the axiom schemata J1, J4 and J5 are valid in F . • If Γ ≺ F ∆, then by Lemma 4.7, there exists Λ ∈ K L such that E ∈ Λ and ∼ F ∈ Λ. In particular, if L = IL − (J2, J4 + ), then Γ ≺ Λ holds. Moreover, if L ∈ {IL − (J2), IL − (J2, J4 + )}, then we may assume Γ ≺ F Θ by Lemma 4.9. Let V := { Θ, F , Λ, F }.
• If Γ ⊀ F ∆, then let V := { Θ, F }. The condition C L is different for each L, and defined as follows:
• IL − (J2, J5): There exist Λ 1 , ρ 1 , Λ 2 , ρ 2 ∈ V such that τ * C ⊆ ρ 2 , ∼ C ∈ Λ 1 , Γ ≺ * C Λ 2 and ∼ C ∈ Λ 2 .
• IL − (J2, J4 + , J5): There exist Λ 1 , ρ 1 , Λ 2 , ρ 2 ∈ V such that τ * C ⊆ ρ 1 , τ * C ⊆ ρ 2 , Γ ≺ Λ 1 , ∼ C ∈ Λ 1 , Γ ≺ * C Λ 2 and ∼ C ∈ Λ 2 . Then W, R, {S x } x∈W is a finite IL − set -frame. Lemma 7.5. Every axiom of L is valid in the frame F = W, R, {S x } x∈W of M .
Proof. J2: As in the proof of Theorem 5.4, J4 is valid in F . Suppose ∆, σ S Γ,τ V and for any ∆ , σ ∈ V ∩ ↑ ( Γ, τ ), ∆ , σ S Γ,τ U ∆ ,σ .
• If τ * C ⊆ σ, Γ ≺ * C ∆ and ∼ C ∈ ∆, then there exists Λ 2 , ρ 2 ∈ V such that τ * C ⊆ ρ 2 , Γ ≺ * C Λ 2 and ∼ C ∈ Λ 2 . Since Λ 2 , ρ 2 ∈ V ∩ ↑ ( Γ, τ ), we have Λ 2 , ρ 2 S Γ,τ U Λ2,ρ2 . Since τ * C ⊆ ρ 2 , Γ ≺ * C Λ 2 and ∼ C ∈ Λ 2 , by the definition of S, the set U Λ2,ρ2 satisfies the condition C L . Thus we obtain ∆, σ S Γ,τ U Λ2,ρ2 .
• If not, then let Θ, ρ ∈ V be such that Γ, τ R Θ, ρ . Since Θ, ρ ∈ V ∩ ↑ ( Γ, τ ), we have Θ, ρ S Γ,τ U Θ,ρ . In particular, ∆, σ S Γ,τ U Θ,ρ .
In either case, by Monotonicity, ∆, σ S Γ,τ ( ∆ ,σ ∈V ∩↑( Γ,τ ) U ∆ ,σ ). Therefore J2 is valid in F by Proposition 3.16.
J5: Suppose Γ, τ R ∆, σ and ∆, σ R Θ, ρ . If there exists C such that τ * C ⊆ σ, Γ ≺ * C ∆ and ∼ C ∈ ∆, then τ * C ⊆ ρ because σ ρ. Since Γ ≺ * C ∆ and ∆ ≺ Θ, we have Γ ≺ * C Θ by Lemma 4.5. Also ∼ C, ∼ C ∈ Θ because ∆ ≺ Θ. Therefore we obtain ∆, σ S Γ,τ { Θ, ρ }. By Proposition 3.19, J5 is valid in F .
At last, when L = IL − (J2, J4 + , J5), we prove that J4 + is valid in F . Suppose ∆, σ S Γ,τ V . Then there exists Θ, ρ ∈ V such that Γ, τ R Θ, ρ , and hence Θ, ρ ∈ V ∩ ↑ ( Γ, τ ). If τ * C ⊆ ρ, Γ ≺ * C ∆ and ∼ C ∈ ∆ for some C, then there exist Λ 1 , ρ 1 , Λ 2 , ρ 2 ∈ V such that τ * C ⊆ ρ 1 , τ * C ⊆ ρ 2 , Γ ≺ Λ 1 , ∼ C ∈ Λ 1 , Γ ≺ * C Λ 2 and ∼ C ∈ Λ 2 . In particular, Λ 1 , ρ 1 , Λ 2 , ρ 2 ∈ V ∩ ↑ ( Γ, τ ). Thus we obtain ∆, σ S Γ,τ (V ∩ ↑ ( Γ, τ ). By Proposition 3.10, J4 + is valid in F . Lemma 7.6 (Truth Lemma). For any formula C ∈ Φ and any Γ, τ ∈ W , C ∈ Γ if and only if Γ, τ C.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the construction of C, and we give a proof only for C ≡ (D E).
